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Abstract
As shown by the recent crisis, tax evasion poses a significant problem for countries such as
Greece, Spain and Italy. While these societies certainly possess weaker fiscal institutions
as compared to other EU members, might broader cultural differences between northern
and southern Europe also help to explain citizens’ (un)willingness to pay their taxes? To
address this question, we conduct laboratory experiments in the UK and Italy, two countries
which straddle this North-South divide. Our design allows us to examine citizens’ willing-
ness to contribute to public goods via taxes while holding institutions constant. We report a
surprising result: when faced with identical tax institutions, redistribution rules and audit
probabilities, Italian participants are significantly more likely to comply than Britons. Overall,
our findings cast doubt upon “culturalist” arguments that would attribute cross-country differ-
ences in tax compliance to the lack of morality amongst southern European taxpayers.
Introduction
Modern welfare states face a set of difficult challenges as they adapt to the demographic, eco-
nomic and political strains of the early 21st century. States must struggle to maintain adequate
support for social welfare and educational programs in the face of growing distrust of bureau-
cratic institutions, intense pressures to cut taxes for politically powerful constituencies, and fis-
cal burdens arising from an aging population. The ability of governments to collect revenues in
an efficient and cost-effective manner is of central importance to how successfully states meet
their policy goals. And to ensure a healthy fiscal foundation, states must be able to control (or
reduce) tax evasion on the part of their citizens.
Yet, while Western European states generally possess tax systems sharing many of the same
formal features [1], actual rates of tax compliance vary widely across these societies [2–7].
Moreover, evasion rates also seem to follow a geographic pattern, with high levels of compli-
ance in northern Europe, and widespread under-reporting in the countries further south.
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Using the size of the “shadow economy” as a proxy for tax evasion, Schneider and Enste find
the lowest compliance rates in Western Europe in Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece [4].
The literature has advanced several “institutionalist” theories to account for this cross-
national variation in tax compliance [8]. In large part, these explanations focus on the relation-
ship between the quality of government and citizens’ willingness to comply with fiscal
demands. Specifically, this literature argues that citizens are more likely to pay their taxes if
they believe that the government is spending their money honestly and efficiently [3, 7, 9–17].
By contrast, when citizens perceive public institutions as corrupt and wasteful, they are likely
to reciprocate by being dishonest in turn [18, 19]. Thus, one explanation for EU-wide differ-
ences in levels of tax compliance is that, in southern European countries, people often interact
with low quality institutions for which they are (unsurprisingly) unwilling to pay.
A second set of theories links tax compliance to broader cultural norms and values. Within
Europe, one important axis of cultural variation concerns how different societies draw the
boundaries of moral behavior [18, 20–24]. Specifically, southern European societies are typi-
cally characterized as more “familistic” or “collectivist,” and ethical conduct is often assumed
to apply to only a small circle of familial or personal relationships, while outside of this circum-
scribed network, selfish or opportunistic behavior is norm. In the public sphere, individuals fol-
low the rules not out of some internalized sense of “right” and “wrong,” but only when they are
coerced to do so [24]. By contrast, northern European societies are often said to emphasize val-
ues of “autonomy” or “individualism,” and citizens are presumed to apply the same ethical
principles that prevail within familial relations to conduct in the civic realm.
This distinction between what Tabellini has termed “limited” and “generalized”morality
has direct implications for the level of tax compliance within a society [24–26]. As many schol-
ars have noted, audit rates and punishment probabilities are insufficient to deter cheating in
most cases [10, 27–30], and states must therefore rely upon voluntary compliance to collect fis-
cal dues. However, if “cheating the system” imposes little moral cost, then the willingness to
pay is undermined. Thus, a broader cultural argument would lead us to expect greater tax eva-
sion in southern European countries, independent of institutional performance.
Our research attempts to test this hypothesis using cross-cultural behavioral experiments.
The advantage of this approach is that it allows us to hold formal institutions (e.g. tax rates, audit
probabilities, the efficiency of the state, etc.) constant across countries, and thereby isolate the
influence of broader cultural factors on fiscal behavior [9, 31, 32]. In this paper, we report results
from two countries—the UK and Italy—which we take as “representatives” of northern and
southern Europe. Slemrod estimates the evasion rate in the UK to be around 8% or 9% of GDP
[33], while comparative figures for Italy can reach as high as 25% to 30% [34]. Culturally, Italy is
often vilified—both in the press as well as in popular opinion—as the quintessential “amoral”
society in which people cannot be trusted to behave ethically outside the network of familial and
personal relations [20]. By contrast, Britain is rather typical of Protestant northern European
societies in terms of cross-national rankings of “autonomy” and “individualism” [21, 22].
Our tax experiment involves over 500 participants across multiple locations in Italy and the
UK. The main experimental task consists of a tax compliance scenario in which participants
earning real money are asked to report their income under a variety of tax rates and redistribu-
tive rules. By comparing income declarations across countries, we are able to investigate
whether, independently of the institutions, Italians are indeed less compliant than Britons
when faced with identical fiscal choices.
To preview our main results, we find little evidence to support the contention that the
morality of tax compliance is weaker in Italy, compared to the UK. Instead, when we average
across all of the institutional scenarios in our experiment, we find that the average compliance
rate amongst Italian participants is significantly higher than amongst the British. As we
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describe in more detail below, the size of the British-Italian gap in tax compliance varies
between each of the different scenarios. However, we emphasize that in every scenario of the
experiment, Italian participants report a higher percentage of their income, compared to the
British. These results remain robust to the inclusion of a host of demographic controls, and are
reproduced in multiple experimental locations in the two countries.
In summary, although stereotypes about the “amorality” of Italian (and, more generally,
southern European) taxpayers abound in the popular consciousness, our results suggest that
cultural values cannot explain the significant cross-national variation in evasion rates that we
observe in the real world. In the concluding section, we discuss several implications of our find-
ings for future work.
Methods
Overview
Our experiments were conducted at six universities across the United Kingdom and Italy at
various points during the academic year 2013–2014. To respect the anonymity of participants,
we do not report the experimental locations in this paper, although details are available from
the authors upon request. Our team spent over a year designing and re-designing our experi-
mental protocols to ensure the consistency of the laboratory set-ups and selection pools in each
of these locations. Everything from the recruitment methods, to the way participants entered
the lab, to the final payments procedure was the same in each session. Our experimental
instructions (both oral and on-screen) were also translated and back-translated between Italian
and English by different native speakers to ensure consistency in meaning.
Participants were recruited to the experiment using ORSEE [35]. More specifically, each of
the universities in which we conducted our study maintains an electronic database of individu-
als who had expressed interest in participating in behavioral experiments. These participant
pools are composed mainly of undergraduate students, but also include a number of non-stu-
dents and people who had already graduated. Several days prior to the actual sessions, individ-
uals in the database receive an email informing them of the opportunity to take part in an
upcoming research project (for a reasonable hourly wage). The email also contained a link
where individuals could sign up for one session of their choice from a list of scheduled sessions.
On the day of the experiment, upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were given a ran-
domly-drawn, anonymized ID number and assigned to a corresponding personal computer
terminal. Only participants and the researchers were present for each session. The experiments
were conducted using zTree [36], participants undertook all experimental tasks via computer,
and the terminals were partitioned to ensure that participants could not communicate during
the session, nor observe others in the room. Also, to ensure anonymity, we announced that
decisions and payments would be linked only to participants’ ID-numbers, and not to individ-
ual names.
Once all participants were seated at their individual terminals, we began the session by read-
ing a short introductory script. Participants were informed that they would be asked to com-
plete a number of tasks (which we would gradually describe to them) and make a number of
choices. Based on their choices and the choices of the other participants, they would earn
experimental currency units (ECUs), which would be converted into local currencies (pounds
and euros) at the end of the session. The exchange rate was set so that participants would earn
approximately twice the average hourly wage for student employment in the local context.
Individuals then took part in the tax compliance experiment, which we describe in the follow-
ing section. Finally, we collected demographic and attitudinal information via an online survey,
which was linked to decisions in the experiment using the anonymized ID numbers. In all,
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each session of the experiment lasted about 90 minutes, and participants earned an average of
16 euros or 14.5 pounds for their time. All payments were distributed anonymously in cash.
Importantly, prior to beginning the experimental tasks, participants were given no informa-
tion about the aims of the research project, nor about the decisions we sought to elicit. Also, at
no point whatsoever were participants told that they are taking part in a larger study compar-
ing decision-making across national groups. Finally, when moderating each session, we made
sure to employ only native speakers (and, in the Italian case, speakers with the “correct”
regional accent). These procedures were implemented to ensure that participants would not be
subject to national (or group-level) reputational concerns when making their decisions.
Ethics Statement
Our experiments have been approved by the IRB Committee at the University of Colorado,
Boulder, where the principal investigator holds a professorship. Our project has also been
approved by the Ethics Council of the European Research Council, and the the European Uni-
versity Institute Ethics committee. Finally, our work has been authorized by all of the Italian
and UK laboratories we have used, but we did not undergo a separate university-based IRB
review in these cases. All participants signed a written consent form prior to taking part in the
study. Participants who wish to leave the experiment early could elect to receive a 5 euro /
pound show-up fee. In practice, no individuals refused to participate or dropped out.
Participants
The data we present in this paper are drawn from 31 different experimental sessions involving
a total of 671 participants from a variety of academic disciplines. Because we are interested in
comparing specifically British and Italian participants, we retain the data for only native stu-
dents, whom we define as those individuals born in Britain (Italy) to British (Italian) parents.
Because of a misunderstanding at the recruitment stage, one session in [location anonymized]
enrolled many immigrants. While we excluded the immigrants’ data, we were also concerned
that interacting with a disproportionate number of foreigners may have skewed the behavior of
even native-born participants. We therefore drop this session entirely from the analysis. The
result leaves us with a subset of 531 participants, of which 281 (52.9%) are from Italy and 250
(47.1%) are from the UK (including the entire sample of 671 participants does not substan-
tively change our results). S1 Table presents descriptive statistics for our participant pools.
Overall, 56% of our participants are male, with an average age of 23.8 years (s.d. = 7.7 years).
We note that there are several slight demographic differences between our British and Ital-
ian samples. In particular, British participants are significantly more likely to be employed and
to report a higher willingness to take risks, while Italians are more likely to study economics. In
addition, British participants tend to be more skilled at our real effort task (described below),
and hence earn more ECUs in the experiment. On the other hand, we detect no significant dif-
ferences between the two populations in terms of gender, age, or previous participation in
experiments. We control for all of these demographic characteristics in our analyses below.
Tax Compliance Experiment
Design and Procedure
The tax compliance experiment proceeds as follows. Participants begin by completing a clerical
task, in which they must copy rows of information from a sheet of paper into the computer.
For each correctly copied row, participants earn 10 ECUs. Next, participants are asked to
declare this income for taxation purposes under different scenarios (an example of the income
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reporting screen is shown in S1 Fig). In the terminology of the experiment, each scenario con-
stitutes a “round.” Participants are informed that they are free to declare any amount of their
income—from 0% to 100%—in each round, with the knowledge that they would pay taxes on
only the reported portion of their incomes.
In all, the experiment is composed of nine separate income declaration rounds. Participants
have no prior knowledge of the total number of rounds. In each round, we specify different
rules for the taxation and redistribution of declared incomes (which we describe shortly). In
doing so, we wanted to explore the effects of different causal variables from the tax policy litera-
ture. As a consequence, readers will note that our design is similar to previous tax compliance
experiments that have also investigated the influence of these variables [27, 37–43]. Impor-
tantly, our primary contribution examines how, holding these institutional features constant,
tax compliance varies across countries [9, 31].
In Rounds 1 through 3, we implement a flat 30% tax rate, and vary how tax revenues are
redistributed to participants, thus simulating behavior under different levels of “efficiency” in
providing public goods. In Round 1, there is no redistribution, and all tax revenues are
“wasted.” In Round 2, all taxes collected are redistributed on an equal basis to all participants.
Finally, in Round 3, all taxes collected are first doubled and then redistributed equally to all
participants.
By contrast, in Rounds 4 through 6, we hold redistribution constant and instead vary the tax
rate. We use a flat tax rate of 10% in Round 4, of 30% in Round 5, and of 50% in Round 6. In
each of these rounds, the revenues collected are doubled and redistributed equally to all
participants.
Rounds 7 through 9 are more eclectic. In Rounds 7 and 8, we introduce two different pro-
gressive taxation schemes. In the first scheme, participants falling within the top 10% of
declared incomes pay a 50% tax rate, participants in the bottom 10% of declared incomes pay a
10% tax rate, and everyone else pays a 30% rate. However, participants do not know exactly
where they themselves fall in the overall distribution of declared incomes. In the second pro-
gressive scheme, all income over 100 ECU is taxed at a 50% rate, income between 50 and 100
ECU is taxed at a 30% rate, and all income below 50 ECU is taxed at a 10% rate. Again, under
these two schemes, all taxes collected are doubled and redistributed on an equal basis.
Finally, in Round 9, we donate all tax revenues (collected under a flat 30% tax rate, and then
doubled) to a real world charity, rather than redistributing revenues to the group. We selected
Oxfam for UK participants, and the UNICEF for Italian participants. The order of experimen-
tal scenarios, as well as the rules in each round, are summarized in S2 Table.
In each round, participants were informed that they faced an (independent) 5% probability
of being audited, in which case those who have under-reported their income must pay a fine
equal to twice the amount of uncollected taxes. Importantly, we reveal the results of any audits
only at the conclusion of the experiment. Also, at no point during the experiment do partici-
pants have information about whether other participants are audited, nor indeed, whether
other participants are honestly declaring their own incomes. In fact, we continuously reminded
participants at various points throughout the session that all decisions would be treated anony-
mously. These procedures were implemented to mitigate the influence of reciprocity, condi-
tional cooperation, reputation or wealth effects.
We also took great care to ensure that the experiment would simulate, as much as possible
within a laboratory setting, the private decision problem facing an individual taxpayer. Along
these lines, we intentionally incorporate tax language in our protocols, using words such as
“income,” “taxes,” and “audit” [9, 44]. While the issue of framing effects in tax experiments is
far from settled [27, 45], we believe this design choice offers an improvement over the use of
neutrally-framed compliance games in terms of the ability to stimulate taxpayer motivations.
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In summary, by comparing how income is reported across our nine taxation and redistribu-
tion scenarios, we are able to investigate differences in tax compliance across a range of param-
eters. Furthermore, because other researchers have also employed similar experimental
designs, we are able to use previous studies as an external check on the validity of our results.
Results and Discussion
Fig 1 displays the average percentage of earned income that is reported in each of the nine
rounds, broken down between British and Italian participants. The vertical axis displays the
average tax compliance rate, defined as the percentage of total earned income that is declared
in each round. Several points stand out from the graph. First, comparing Rounds 1 through 3,
we see that compliance responds positively to the efficiency of redistribution: in both countries,
individuals are more willing to declare a larger percentage of their income when they know
that tax revenues produce more public goods. Secondly, individuals respond to higher tax rates
by evading their fiscal obligations: compliance falls as we move from Rounds 4 through 6.
These results are in line with previous studies [27, 37–43], and provide us with some assurance
about the validity of our experimental design.
Turning now to our main results, we document a surprising cross-national difference in
compliance rates: on average, British participants reported a smaller share of their total income
in every round as compared to Italians. As shown in S2 Fig, this finding is also fairly consistent
across multiple experimental locations in each country.
While our visual inspection of the the average compliance rate already yields some interest-
ing patterns, such a statistic also hides substantial nuance in participants’ decision-making.
Specifically, if we examine the distribution of compliance rates across all reporting decisions,
we see that the data are not normal (see Fig 2). Rather, the average compliance rate actually
aggregates three different outcomes:
Fig 1. Average compliance rates, by country, in rounds 1 through 9. Bar heights represent the average
percentage of earned income that is reported. The compliance rate is lower amongst British participants in
every single round. This difference is statistically significant at the 5% level in rounds 1 through 5, and round
8. In addition, it is statistically significant at the 10% level in round 6 (results available from the authors, upon
request).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0150277.g001
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1. Complete Compliance: In 44.1% of all decisions, participants declare 100% of their earned
income.
2. Partial Evasion: In 27.5% of all decisions, participants under-report their income to some
degree.
3. Complete Evasion: In 28.4% of all decisions, participants report that they earned 0 income.
We wish to emphasize that we define these three categories of compliance at the decision
level, and not at the individual level. We adopt this operationalization because individuals’
choices may vary across the different rounds of the experiment (e.g. a participant could declare
0% in round 1, and 100% in round 2), and a priori, we had no strong priors about how to clas-
sify individuals. For example, if participant A reports 50% of his income in all rounds, while
participant B reports 100% of her income in half of the rounds, and 0% in the other half, it was
unclear to us that both A and B could be classified as “dishonest” to the same degree. To avoid
making (arbitrary) decisions about how to define honesty at the individual level, we opt instead
to define categories of compliance at the decision level.
The distributions in Fig 2 are similar to the patterns observed in other experimental studies
of tax compliance [27, 46], as well as in “real world” tax declarations. In particular, Alm et al.
examined a sample of 1,673 randomly-audited tax returns from the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS), focusing solely on self-declared sole-proprietorship income [46]. This income source
was selected because it generates no third-party reporting information (e.g. FormW-2 for
wage income), and therefore mimics the declaration decision in the laboratory. These authors
find that the compliance behavior of real taxpayers also conforms to the U-shaped patterns dis-
played in Fig 2. In other words, the similarity between our results and Alm et al.’s “taxpayer
sample” suggests that our participants are treating the experimental decision-problem as a
“real life” problem of tax compliance.
Fig 2. Distribution of compliance decisions, all rounds, by country. Bar heights represent the
percentage of reporting decisions in which compliance falls within the ranges [0%–5%], [5%–10%]. . .[95%–
100%]. The distribution is predominately bimodal: in 44.1% of all decisions, participants declare 100% of their
earned income, while in 28.4% of all decisions, participants report that they earned 0 income.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0150277.g002
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Table 1 examines how this U-shaped pattern differs between the UK and Italy. Columns (1)
through (3) of Table 1 display the proportion of decisions in each round characterized by com-
plete evasion. We see that in almost all rounds (except 50% Tax Rate and Charity), a signifi-
cantly greater percentage of decisions made by British participants result in a declaration of 0.
The UK-Italy gaps are substantively large, ranging from about 8% of decisions in Round 7 to
almost 18% of decisions in Round 2. In columns (4) through (6), we see the corresponding
totals for the proportion of decisions in each round that are completely compliant. Here, the
data tell a similar story: in the majority of rounds, significantly more Italians report their entire
income. The cross-country gaps range from 10% to 18%. Finally, columns (7) though (9) exam-
ine the proportion of partial evasion decisions in each country. Here, however, we see that
there are no statistically significant differences. In short, we see that British participants are (a)
less likely to report 100% of their incomes, and (b) more likely to report exactly 0 income. By
contrast, the proportion of decisions in which individuals engage in partial evasion is almost
identical in the two countries.
However, in addition to considering the raw proportion of partial evasions decisions in each
round, we must also examine the percentage of taxes declared in this subset. We consider this
possibility in columns (10) through (12) of Table 1. Here, we analyze only the subset of partial
evasion decisions and ask: conditional upon engaging in partial evasion, how much income is
actually reported? Interestingly, here as well we detect almost no statistically significant differ-
ences between Italian and British participants (with the exception of the very first round). In
other words, neither the proportion of partial evasion decisions, nor the percentage of income
declared in these partial evasion decisions, is very different across our two countries. Rather, it
appears that the Italy-UK compliance gap is driven almost entirely by differences in complete
compliance and complete evasion.
To what extent can our findings be explained by demographic differences between our par-
ticipant pools? Controlling for individual-level characteristics that may be correlated with the
compliance rate, do Britons still declare less than Italians? To address these questions, we esti-
mate the conditional effect of an Italy country dummy on the compliance rate, holding other
Table 1. Distribution of Complete Evasion, Complete Compliance and Partial Evasion Decisions.
No. of Decisions:
Complete Evasion
No. of Decisions:
Complete Compliance
No. of Decisions: Partial
Evasion
% of Income Declared by
Partial Evaders:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Italy UK Diff. Italy UK Diff. Italy UK Diff. Italy UK Diff.
R1: No Redistribuiton 0.33 0.50 -0.17* 0.33 0.19 0.14* 0.34 0.30 0.03 0.59 0.47 0.11*
R2: Redistribution 0.26 0.44 -0.18* 0.48 0.31 0.17* 0.26 0.25 0.01 0.52 0.48 0.03
R3: Redistribution x 2 0.13 0.30 -0.17* 0.66 0.48 0.18* 0.21 0.22 -0.01 0.51 0.55 -0.04
R4: 10% Tax Rate 0.16 0.32 -0.17* 0.64 0.48 0.17* 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.60 0.49 0.11
R5: 30% Tax Rate 0.23 0.34 -0.11* 0.47 0.37 0.10* 0.30 0.29 0.01 0.55 0.49 0.06
R6: 50% Tax Rate 0.31 0.38 -0.07 0.39 0.35 0.04 0.30 0.27 0.03 0.51 0.48 0.03
R7: Progressive 1 0.27 0.35 -0.08* 0.39 0.35 0.04 0.34 0.30 0.04 0.50 0.47 0.02
R8: Progressive 2 0.21 0.32 -0.11* 0.39 0.29 0.10* 0.40 0.39 0.01 0.51 0.49 0.02
R9: Charity 0.14 0.17 -0.03 0.69 0.63 0.06 0.17 0.02 -0.03 0.55 0.53 0.02
N Italy = 281; N UK = 250.
We employed Schlag’s Z-test to test for country-level differences in columns (3), (6) and (9), and Mann-Whitney tests in column (12).
* indicates whether differences between countries are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0150277.t001
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factors constant. Following [46], our basic specification is:
Yi;t ¼ b0 þ b1Italyi þ b2Incomei;t þ b3Xi þ ct þ ui þ i;t
where the dependent variable Yi,t denotes the percentage of income reported by participant i in
round t; Italyi is a dummy variable for Italian participants; Incomei,t is participant i’s earned
income (standardized) in round t; Xi denotes a vector of demographic variables including gen-
der, age, employment status, economics training, previous participation in behavioral experi-
ments, self-reported risk attitudes, and self-reported beliefs about the behavior of other
participants; ψt is a set of T − 1 dummies that capture round ﬁxed effects; ui are random effects
that control for unobservable individual characteristics; and i,t is an individual-round error
term. A more detailed description of these variables is available in the supplementary materials.
Following [46], we report results for a (participant) random effects generalized least squares
estimation with standard errors corrected for clustering at the individual level. Results are pre-
sented in Table 2.
Table 2 shows that gender, economics training, past participation in experiments, risk atti-
tudes, and beliefs about others’ behavior are all correlated with compliance. Several results are
worth emphasizing: first, unsurprisingly, participants who are more risk-taking also comply
less. In addition, British participants self-rate as more risk-taking on average. Thus, the inclu-
sion of the risk variable in the regression with only the Italyi dummy tends to shrink the cross-
country compliance gap from 13% to 8% (results not shown). However, the coefficient on Italyi
is still significant at the 1% level.
Table 2. Estimates of the Compliance Rate.
(1) (2) (3)
Italy 0.13** (0.03) 0.12** (0.03) 0.10** (0.03)
Income (standardized) -0.03** (0.01) -0.02 (0.01)
Male -0.17** (0.03)
Age (standardized) 0.01 (0.01)
Employed -0.04 (0.03)
Economics Training -0.09** (0.03)
Previous Participation -0.09** (0.03)
Risk (standardized) -0.06** (0.01)
Others Report: “Less” -0.12** (0.04)
Others Report: “Much Less” -0.26** (0.04)
Constant 0.52** (0.02) 0.37** (0.02) 0.74** (0.04)
Wald χ2 20.94** 460.2** 871.8**
Number of Participants 531 531 512
Number of Decisions 4779 4779 4608
Round Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
Panel estimations with participant random effects and clustered (participant level) standard errors. The dependent variable is the percentage of earned
income that is declared for tax purposes by individual i in round t.
** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
The number of observations drops slightly once we include demographic covariates in model (3). This is because the experimental tasks were
implemented in zTree, while the demographic information was collected separately using Qualtrics survey software. This necessitated that participants
enter their anonymous IDs twice: once into zTree, and once again into Qualtrics. Because some participants accidentally entered different IDs into the two
systems, we were unable to match their experimental decisions with their demographic data.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0150277.t002
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Second, individuals who believe that others are dishonest are themselves less likely to com-
ply. This echoes other findings on the importance of social norms for tax compliance [47]. We
also note that Italians are on average more pessimistic about the behavior of their counterparts.
Thus, controlling for beliefs in the regression slightly increases the size of the cross-country
gap from 13% to 14% (results not shown). We also tested whether the relationship between
beliefs and compliance differs across our two countries by interacting beliefs with a country
dummy (results not shown), but the coefficient on the interaction term was not statistically
significant.
Third, in line with earlier studies [48–52], we find that men and economists are less compli-
ant. Since there are slightly more economists amongst Italian participants, controlling for this
variable also inflates the cross-country compliance gap from 13% to 15% (results not shown).
Fourth, we note that individuals who have participated in experiments in the past report less of
their income on average, compared to first-time participants. We believe this result reflects the
fact that first-time participants may take the experimental tax frame more seriously, while indi-
viduals who participate in multiple experiments may treat the experience as more of a game,
and may therefore report less of their income. Finally, we find some evidence that higher earn-
ers report less of their income. In model (2) with only the Italy dummy and round fixed effects,
a one SD increase in income earned in the clerical task is associated with a 3% drop in the com-
pliance rate (p-value = 0.009). With additional controls (model 3), the association remains neg-
ative (2% drop), but is no longer statistically significant at conventional levels (p-
value = 0.071).
Most importantly, we find that even controlling for all of these characteristics, the Italian
country dummy remains substantively strong and statistically significant. While a simple com-
parison of the average compliance rate across countries (model 1) shows that Italians report
about 13% more of their total income than British participants, this estimate falls only slightly
once we include round fixed effects and a control for earned incomes (model 2), as well as
other individual level controls (model 3). We also note that our results remain substantively
unchanged when the analysis is run using a series of tobit models (available upon request).
Importantly, the core finding that Italian participants are systematically more compliant in
their fiscal decision-making remains robust in our regression models. In model 3, with the full
host of controls, the country gap remains at 10%.
To what extent can we interpret these results as evidence that Italians possess a stronger eth-
ics of tax compliance? Are “culturalist” arguments about the (lack of) morality amongst south-
ern European taxpayers simply wrong? Or might other factors that we have not controlled for
account for our surprising results? Here, we discuss two potential confounds: trust in anonym-
ity, and group-level reputational concerns.
First, although we emphasized the anonymity of decisions at multiple points throughout the
experiment, the propensity of participants to trust our assurances may vary across countries.
For instance, Italian participants may be more suspicious that their anonymity could somehow
be compromised, and therefore act more compliantly than they would otherwise.
While we obviously cannot directly control what participants in different societies believe
about lab experiments, we have worked to the best of our ability to guarantee to participants
that their decisions would be treated anonymously. In particular, information about confi-
dentiality was prominently displayed on the consent forms that participants signed prior to
taking part in the experiments. On these forms, it was also stated that participants would be
given anonymous ID numbers and randomly assigned to computer stations. Participants also
knew that, after the experiment, they would be paid anonymously in sealed envelopes linked
only to their ID number. The consent form itself was approved by institutional review boards
in two countries, and our confidentiality procedures were scrupulously vetted. We strongly
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believe that these procedures made it obvious to participants in both Italy and the UK that
their anonymity would not be compromised.
A second potential confound relates to a concern we have already noted about maintaining
a positive reputation. Specifically, participants in the lab know that they are being observed,
and this feeling of being “under the microscope” (especially with respect to a sensitive topic
such as tax evasion) may bring about more compliance than would otherwise prevail in the
“real world.” Furthermore, the size of this effect may differ between Italy and the UK. In partic-
ular, Italians may be more concerned about their collective reputation as a “high evasion”
nation. They may therefore act more compliantly in the experiment in order to show their
rejection of this stereotype. Importantly, this dynamic may still obtain even though (a) our
moderators were all native speakers, and (b) participants were not informed that they would be
compared to individuals in another country.
While we cannot rule out this alternative explanation for our results, we note that this
dynamic is also present in other cross-national experimental studies on tax compliance [9, 31,
53], and does not seem to compromise the validity of earlier findings. Therefore, although we
acknowledge that reputation concerns may be potential confounding variable, we believe that
these concerns do not play a prominent role in accounting for our results.
Conclusions and Implications
Turning now to the original question animating our study, what light can our experiment shed
on the current fiscal crises facing European countries? Clearly, many northern Europeans (and
Americans) hold the view that the difficulties facing Greece, Italy, Spain and others are not sim-
ply the product of poor institutions or badly designed public policies, but are instead symptom-
atic of a far more fundamental problem—one of culture. In a nutshell, southern Europe’s fiscal
conundrum is said to stem from the fact that, in such “limited morality” societies, the “moral
costs” of non-compliance are insufficient to ensure effective tax collection.
The problem, analytically, is that culture and institutions are difficult to disentangle and are
almost certainly interdependent. For example, Italians may readily cheat on their taxes in “real
life” precisely because they believe that the state—in corruptly and inefficiently using their tax
revenue—is also cheating them. In fact, recent public opinion polls have shown that southern
Europeans give their governments consistently low scores on control of corruption and the
quality of service delivery [54, 55]. By contrast, northern Europeans’ high willingness to pay
may be a direct reflection of their belief that taxes go to support important public services
which they value and personally consume.
In this article we have tried to analyze the specific question of whether southern Europeans
(in this case, Italians) would behave differently than northern Europeans (in this case, the Brit-
ish) when faced with exactly the same institutions. We discovered, much to our own surprise,
that British participants are more likely to under-declare their incomes in a tax / public goods
experiment than Italians. While we do not pretend that our study has isolated all of the cultural
variables that may influence tax compliance decision-making, at a minimum, our results cast
doubt on the above-mentioned “culturalist” arguments.
We find these results encouraging. If it were indeed the case that culture dominates institu-
tional structure, then the prospects for Europe—and for much of the developing world today—
would be grim indeed. Instead, we show that when given the opportunity to contribute to and
share in collective goods on an equal institutional playing field, Italians behave no worse than
their British counterparts. Thus, we believe that a specific focus on institutional reforms and
improving the “Quality of Government” [19] is likely to yield more significant results than the
cultural blame game that too often seeps into the policy debate.
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